Suggested Citation: Paloyo, Alfredo R.; Vance, Colin; Vorell, Matthias (2010) The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors. 
Introduction
Against the background of the transformation of the German Federal Defense Forces, we examine the socioeconomic impact of military bases on the surrounding communities. In particular, we focus on the effects of military bases and military personnel on the level of crime of the surrounding area. The current realignment of the German Federal Defense Forces gives us the unique opportunity to use a natural experiment to estimate the causal impact of military base closures on crime.
Crime is a complex social phenomenon that deserves special focus from social scientists.
Various aspects of crime have been examined by psychologists, sociologists, lawyers, political scientists, and, beginning with the work of Becker [1968] and its extension by Ehrlich [1973] , by economists as well. Applications of economic theories of rational choice tend to explain the observed trends in deviant behavior quite well. 1 The reason we expect a relationship to exist between military bases and the crime rate is that young men commit the majority of crimes (for a variety of reasons explained in Section 2), and young men comprise the majority of the military-base population. The German armed forces (Bundeswehr) is composed primarily of men: women comprise a mere 9 percent. 2 Moreover, there is evidence that conscription could lead men to commit crimes in the future, and Germany is among the few remaining countries in Western Europe to rely on compulsory military service to staff its armed forces. For example, using a natural experiment in the assignment of draft-eligibility status through a lottery system in Argentina, Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky [2010] find that participation in military service increases the likelihood of having a criminal record in the future, particularly when the crime involves weapons. It is therefore conceivable that the composition of personnel inside a military base could have an impact on the level of crime observed around the base's surroundings.
Much of the attention to studies of crime is justified by the sheer magnitude of criminal activities and its associated social costs. Take the case of a burglary. One needs to keep in mind that the costs of such a legal breach is not borne simply by the victim. There are also lawenforcement costs related to determining and apprehending the suspect, as well as the cost of having police personnel in the first place to prevent such crimes. Upon arrest, the legal system also comes into play: lawyers' fees must be paid as well as judges' salaries. In jurisdictions with juries, the opportunity costs of members of the jury must also be taken into account. Moreover, there is the expected response of the victim and her neighbors, who will now presumably undertake more security measures such as installing electronic anti-burglary systems or safer windows. Considering the number of crimes committed every year, the associated annual total social cost would be staggering-and this is even without acknowledging the non-pecuniary costs of victimization, such as psychological stress. As a rough measure, Table 1 presents the direct cost of crime as esimated by the Federal Criminal Police Office in Germany. Despite having one of the lowest crime rates-even for Western European standardsthe federal government in Germany has been consciously addressing the issue of criminality within its borders. The contribution of this study is to examine the effects of the programmed military base realignments and closures (BRACs) in Germany-in particular, the effect on criminal activity surrounding the base. 3 Reducing crime is a matter of public policy, and any initiative that contributes to this goal, whether inadvertently or deliberately, requires careful study to guide policymakers. Within the context of the on-going massive reorganization of the German armed forces, it becomes necessary to evaluate the potential effects of BRACs not only on defense and strategic grounds but also on outcomes that are perhaps less obvious to the casual observer. Accounting for the hidden costs and benefits of such a reorganization is therefore of 3 Paloyo, Vance and Vorell [N.d.] examine the more obvious economic impacts of such base closures.
5 paramount importance in order to avoid basing policy decisions on incomplete information.
In this regard, the relationship between military bases and the level of local criminal activity is murky, and one for which there is a dearth of empirical evidence. While the overall impression gleaned from press reports, particularly from the US, is one of elevated crime within the surrounding community owing to the presence of a base 4 , academic accounts are often more sanguine. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer [2001] are shut down solely due to military reasons and requirements without regard to potential outcomes at the community level. A standard fixed-effects regression model is used to account for residual concerns about the potential endogeneity of BRACs, although, as will be emphasized later in Section 5, there is substantial evidence to suggest that planned BRACs were unrelated to the outcome variables of interest. Furthermore, we estimate our regression models over data that have been transformed with geographic information system (GIS) software. More explicitly, we create buffer zones that surround each base to deal with issues associated with using regional data based on politically-delineated borders.
To preview our results, we find that the base realignments and closures had no significant effect on total crime around the periphery of the base. This result holds across different categories of crime and over varying sizes of the surrounding buffer zone. We conclude that concerns about changes in the level of criminal activity are unwarranted when weighing the costs and benefits to the local community of military base closures. Total recorded offenses (in 100,000) 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9
Young men and crime
Year Male Female (a) Total crime 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 Crimes against life 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Table 2 . 5 Here, we see that the trend in violent crimes committed by employees of the Bundeswehr seems to follow a similar pattern depicted in Figure 1 (b). We take advantage of structural reforms, described in depth in the next chapter, being undertaken in the German Federal Defense Forces to examine the relationship, if any, between the presence of a military base and criminal activity surrounding the base. 
The transformation of the German armed forces
For Germany, the threat of a border invasion has all but dissipated. This is due to a number of factors but primarily because the Cold War has ended, and the European Union has established itself as a viable political and economic agglomeration of countries. The security threats faced by Germany (and many other countries in the Western world) now come from substate and stateless terrorist organizations from as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The military deployment strategy that was appropriate to defend Germany against an inva-sion originating from the other side of the Iron Curtain is now acknowledged to be insufficient to protect Germany and its citizens from organizations that threaten it today. 6
In response to these changes, new Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) were adopted by the German Parliament in 2003. These guidelines emphasized the transition of the German armed forces from a territorial defense force into one that could be deployed rapidly and internationally to address security concerns abroad. The task of the Bundeswehr now involves "multinational conflict prevention and crisis management operations" while everything else "not conducive to this goal is of secondary importance. More recently, the current Defense Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, has proposed a plan to even more drastically reduce the size of the Bundeswehr. From its current complement of 245,000 soldiers, zu Guttenberg intends to cut it down to 163,500 over the next few years.
The plan also includes the suspension of compulsory military service and the transformation of the Bundeswehr into a professional army composed of an all-volunteer force, which is presum-ably more effective. The plan also includes raising the average number of military personnel in a base to 900, which means the realignment of personnel and the closure of redundant bases. 8
The impetus for this new proposal from the Federal Ministry of Defense is the global economic and financial crisis that erupted in 2007. To cope with the crisis, Germany embarked on policies that stimulated aggregate demand. However, such policies, of course, exert pressure on a country's budget. Today, Germany must endure some expenditure compression to maintain fiscal balance. To contribute to this effort, the Defense Ministry and zu Guttenberg has come up with their proposal, which aims to save e 8.3 billion over the next four years.
Abolishing conscription alone will save about e 500 million per year. 9
For some bases, downsizing the military complement might prove difficult. Consider the top 10 Gemeinden (municipalities or towns) by military personnel presented in Table 3 . In 2003, the base in Koblenz employed 8,830 persons, which represented about 8 percent of the population in that area in 2003. However, in the same year, the average military complement for a base is about 324 individuals. Thus, to achieve Minister zu Guttenberg's target, the realignment of personnel will have to be substantial. 
Data description
The dataset used in our analysis contains 298 bases, of which 105 were eventually closed. 10 Table 4 In general, violent crime is reserved for more serious cases. The categories are exclusive,
i.e., crimes are not counted in more than one group. If a person commits a combination of crimes, say, running over someone to get money for drugs, the most serious offense is recorded.
Typically, when a violent crime is committed together with a property crime, the event is counted under the latter category. 12 The list of crimes in the dataset is not exhaustive, and in all cases, the sum of the different crime variables that are available does not equal the total number of crimes for a particular area.
The data are spatial in nature, which we take into account by transforming the data first before assembling and preparing it for estimation. The transformation involves the use of GIS software to create buffer zones-circular areas with the base at its center-that surround a base and which take into account the information from the surrounding Kreise. To do this, we first draw a buffer zone around the centroid of the Gemeinde where the base is located. 13 The area of overlap for each Kreise contained in this buffer zone is calculated and then divided by the total 12 The most prominent example is theft in combination with assault, which is recorded as a property crime. 13 We therefore assume that the base is located in the center of a Gemeinde.
area of the buffer zone. The resulting ratio is used to weight the information assigned to that
Kreis. This allows us to compute a weighted sum that summarizes the available information from the surrounding Kreise of a particular base. This approach, also favored by Banzhaf and Walsh [2008] for applications to US census data, incorporates the information from the home and surrounding Kreise. It ameliorates some of the difficulties associated with the so-called modifiable areal unit problem [Openshaw 1984 ], such as the use of varying and arbitrarily sized spatial units of analysis.
Consider, for instance, the case depicted in Figure 3 . Here, the Gemeinde (crosshatch pattern) is located at the edge of its home Kreis (gray). If we were to take into account-using the method described above-that it shares the border with two other Kreise, we would calculate total crime associated with that military base as follows:
total crime
, where i and j are the Kreis (where the base is located) and buffer zone, respectively. For our purposes, we set the radius of the buffer zones to 12 km and 20 km. This allows us to roughly determine how far from the centroid the effect, if any, travels.
One drawback in processing the data this way is the assumption that the surfaces are isotropic, i.e., that the magnitude of the effect emanating from the centroid is invariant with respect to direction. This is problematic when the politically delineated borders are the result of natural features such as mountains and rivers, over which the effects may not necessarily propagate as easily as over plains. Therefore, we also estimate our model using untransformed data, i.e., without the buffer-zone transformation, to check the robustness of our results.
While we have every reason to believe that the decision pertaining to which bases will be closed is based purely on strategic grounds, we nevertheless perform an equality-of-means test between areas where bases closed and areas where bases stayed open to show that these bases do not differ in their observed characteristics. This implies that, at least in terms of the observables, the places with base closures are comparable to those places without base closures.
We perform the test for two years: specifically, 2003, where the bases are first observed in the dataset, and 2007, where they are last observed. The results are displayed in Table 5 . They indicate that there is no substantial difference between the areas where a base closed and the 
Estimation strategy and results
To identify the impact of adjustments in the size of military bases, including closures, we estimate the following regression model:
where y it is a generic outcome variable (here, total crime and its subcategories) for unit i in year t, DP it is the number of military personnel in thousands (Dienstposten), x it is a vector of control variables, z t is a vector of unit-invariant year fixed effects, and e it a stochastic disturbance term with the usual properties. The coefficients α, δ, β, and θ are a set of parameters and parameter vectors to be estimated. The coefficient of interest is δ, which represents the causal effect of BRACs on criminal activity surrounding the base.
We exploit the panel structure of the dataset by augmenting Equation (1) with a timeinvariant and buffer-specific (or, in the case of the untransformed data, Kreis-specific) fixed effect:
The term φ i represents unobserved community-specific characteristics that affect the outcome variable but do not change over time. For instance, certain geographic characteristics are captured by φ i . Allowing for the possibility that this term is correlated with e it , we proceed to apply a fixed-effect transformation to the data to eliminate any residual biases.
As noted in the introduction, one important institutional aspect is that the decision to close or downsize a military base was made purely on strategic grounds that were unrelated to the intensity of criminal activity surrounding the selected base. As opposed to the US experience, where the execution of the base closures was substantially influenced by the demands of the local communities in which bases were located [Brauer and Marlin 1992] , the military drawdown in Germany was not altered by popular or political considerations. The planning period of the scheme covered two government periods and both major political parties. No planned The outcome variables used in this study are the following: total crime, breaking and entering, automobile-related crime, violent crime, and drug-related crime. These are all logarithmized so that the coefficients can be directly interpreted as semi-elasticities. The control variables contained in x it are an indicator variable that equals 1 for East Germany and 0 otherwise (this is eliminated in the fixed-effects model through the within transformation), real GNP in million euro (lagged one year), the share of the unemployed in the community, the share of foreigners in the community, the share of young men (aged 15-25 years old) in the community, household disposable income relative to the national mean (lagged one year), and population in ten thousands. All control variables are measured at the level of the Kreis.
In light of the seminal studies of Becker [1968] and Ehrlich [1973] , we hypothesize that variables that increase either economic well-being or the likelihood of arrest serve as deterrents to crime. More precisely, anything that increases the returns to licit activities relative to illicit activities should reduce the propensity to commit crime. These include real GNP and relative disposable income. Conversely, variables that undermine social cohesion or economic security are hypothesized to increase the crime level, such as the share of foreigners and of the unemployed. In addition, we expect positive relationships between (i) the share of foreigners and crime and (ii) the share of young men and crime owing to a higher incidence of economic duress and exclusion from the labor market within these groups. Being located in East Germany is also hypothesized to be associated with higher levels of crime given a sustained period of depressed economic conditions in that region. Finally, as large populations have generally been found to be associated with higher crime, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable Estimates of the coefficients based on Equations (1) and (2) are presented in Tables 6 and   7 , respectively. Both tables use the GIS-transformed data with the 12-kilometer buffer. The appendix presents results using a 20-kilometer buffer as well as the untransformed data.
Based on OLS regressions, we note that the presence of military personnel has no evident impact on crime levels across most of the measured categories. The one exception is The fixed-effects estimates presented in Table 7 mitigate biases arising from time-invariant unobservable variables that are contemporaneously correlated with the error term. On the whole, the qualitative findings do not vary markedly. With regard to military personnel, the results confirm the impression gleaned from the OLS estimates that this variable is not significantly correlated with crime. The most notable discrepancy is seen for the coefficient estimate for the share of young men, which now has the expected positive coefficient in each of the models.
Conclusion
The ongoing reorganization of the German armed forces is arguably the most massive reconfiguration of the country's military since World War II, with potentially profound implications both geopolitically and at the local level in communities where military bases are located.
Among the effects plausibly instigated by a base closure is a change in the intensity of criminal activities. To the extent that the personnel who populate the bases are largely comprised of young men-the demographic segment most prone to criminal activity-it is conceivable that the closures would reduce crime rates. Given the substantial financial and psychic costs of crime, such an outcome would register as a clear benefit to communities otherwise concerned about the economic impacts of the closures. This paper has attempted to empirically address this issue by assembling a panel dataset that links regional crime rates to military base complements and socioeconomic variables.
While our analysis confirms the significance of many of the correlates of crime identi- In deriving policy implications from these findings, we would avoid making claims about any relationship between criminal behavior and military service at the individual level; such questions could only be addressed with micro-level data. Nevertheless, as a matter of regional public policy, our findings strongly suggest that base closures or the reallocation of military personnel across bases, will have no effect on the crime level in the communities affected. 
